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Preventing False Trips of Zone 3 Protection Relays in Smart Grid
Jiapeng Zhang and Yingfei Dong
Abstract: While remote zone 3 protection relays are essential to power systems, their false trips are also one of
main causes related to cascading blackouts. Although many methods have been developed on traditional power
systems to address this issue, the past cascading failure events showed the ineffectiveness of these methods.
With the development of Smart Grid (SG), new agent-based methods have been proposed to address this issue
by utilizing SG real-time communications. We found that these solutions simply assume ideal communication
networks and do not consider the effect of practical network constraints and resource management. In this paper,
we propose several solutions to address practical network resource management and constraints, and further
improve the agent-based solutions in order to prevent the false tripping of zone 3 relays in various conditions. We
also analyze the potential issues of these solutions, and point out the future investigation in this direction.
Key words: zone 3 relay; cascading failure; real-time communications; smart grid

1

Introduction

As device failures due to aging, natural disasters,
or malicious attacks can cause serious damages to
power system components and transmission lines,
and generate large disturbances across the systems,
current power transmission systems use various local
relays and remote relays to isolate such failures and
prevent disturbances from wide spreading. Among
these protection devices, directional relays (especially
remote zone 3 relays) are essential to transmission lines
for remote backup and broadly deployed in current
systems[1, 2] . However, over-sensitive remote zone 3
relays caused certain unexpected trips and further
spread cascading failures in many cases[3, 4] . In this
paper, we focus on this critical issue to prevent such
false trips.
Although many solutions have been developed on
traditional power systems to address this issue[5–7] , they
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failed to completely eliminate the problems. As shown
in recent large scale failures[3] , these solutions did not
stop the cascading failures due to remote relay failures
in many cases.
The recent fast development of Smart Grid
(SG) provides us new opportunities to address
these issues more accurately and effectively. In
SG, intelligent power devices are connected with
communication networks and support real-time
monitoring and control across wide areas. Such
real-time communication capability enables us to
achieve more intelligent, effective, and precise control
of power systems. Although several agent-based
solutions[8, 9] have been proposed to utilize SG
communications to deal with the false trips of zone
3 relays, they do not consider the practical network
issues and simply assume dedicated communication
paths in ideal network conditions, which may not be
true in practice due to many potential issues, e.g.,
routers or links errors, misconfigurations, or network
attacks, often disrupt dedicated communication
paths. Especially, more and more new SG control and
monitoring applications and services will be deployed
across large areas for efficiency, reliability, and
protection[10–13] . They often also demand high data rates
and lower latency (e.g., emerging PMU operations[12] )

Jiapeng Zhang et al.: Preventing False Trips of Zone 3 Protection Relays in Smart Grid

and may cause temporary congestion (e.g., in a
diagnostic mode). Therefore, we cannot simply assume
a dedicated network for each application and have to
carefully assign and manage communication network
resources to support the operations of many SG
applications.
In this paper, we propose several methods to improve
the performance of zone 3 relay protection and then
discuss the potential issues under practical network
conditions. As we become more dependent on power
systems, the reliability of power system becomes even
more critical. Existing agent-based solutions assume
dedicated network paths between agents and a master
agent under ideal conditions for monitoring and control
actions. For achieving a higher reliability than the
existing solutions, we first present a static reservation
scheme and then improve it with smart reservation
and backup paths to deal with network failures. Even
though such path failures may be not often, it still
could generate a significant impact on zone 3 relay
management. More importantly, the proposed network
management solutions are applicable to many other
real-time control and monitoring systems, not limited
to zone 3 protection only.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. We discuss related work in Section 2 and
introduce the analysis of existing schemes and present
new solutions in Section 3. We then evaluate the
proposed solutions and show their effectiveness in
Section 4 and conclude this paper and discuss future
investigation in Section 5.

2

Related Work

Distance protection relays are one of the most
common relays used for power transmission
lines[1] . The operation of a distance relay is determined
by the impedance measured by the relay, which is
used to estimate the distance from the relay to a
fault. We usually have three protection zones as shown
in Fig. 1[9] . Protection zone 1 is the basic protection of
a distance relay, which covers about 80% of the length
of a transmission line. The protection zone 2 covers
a little more than zone 1, usually about 120% of the
length of a transmission line. Protection zone 3 covers
the first transmission line and also about 80% of the
second line. We can adjust the relay settings for zone
1, zone 2, and zone 3 protection, and construct both
primary protection and backup protection with different

Fig. 1
3[9] .
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Distance protection relays: zone 1, zone 2, and zone

delays. Normally, we use zone 1 as the primary
protection, which is almost immediately triggered
when a fault is detected, e.g., with a delay of a few
milliseconds. We use zone 2 and zone 3 protection as
backup mechanisms, which are triggered after given
tripping delays when a fault is detected. These tripping
delays are often determined by the protection distance,
e.g., a zone 2 protection may wait for 0.3 s, and a zone
3 protection may wait up to 1 s[8, 9] .
Hidden failures have been considered one of the
main sources of large scale disturbances[3, 5, 14] . A
hidden failure occurs when incorrect system states
or control actions are triggered by another system
event. It may induce widespread cascading failures
such as the Northeastern blackout in 2003, which is
initialized by a false relay trip[15] . Although solutions
to hidden failures on traditional power systems have
been extensively investigated[4, 7, 9] , it is still extremely
challenging to completely prevent such failures on
large-scale complicated power systems.
The false trips of zone 3 relays are often associated
with hidden failures[7] , as shown in the past events. Such
false trips have been identified among the main causes
of blackouts (about 70%[3, 6] ). In the meantime, zone
3 protection is also considered essential to power
systems and we really rely on such protection in many
cases[1, 2] . To deal with such false trips, new agent-based
solutions have been proposed by utilizing smart grid
communication networks[8, 9] .
SG is in rapid development due to its salient features
such as improving efficiency and reliability, better
utilizing renewable energy, etc.[10, 11, 16–18] . One key
difference between the SG and the traditional power
systems is that SG enables two-way power transmission
with intelligent devices that exploits the rapid increase
of computing power and the ubiquitous network
communication systems. Many SG technologies have
developed and many more new SG applications are still
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in development, e.g., PMU technology[12] .
Agent-based methods use a query-response model
to avoid zone 3 false trips. A software agent is deployed
at each relay. When a zone 3 relay r detects a remote
disturbance from a line l, it will send a query to a
Master Agent (MA) to verify if such a disturbance has
been seen by other relays associated with the same
transmission line. The MA then queries all related
relays to pull their readings. After the MA receives
all responses from these relays, it can determine if
the disturbance on line l is a real fault or simply a
temporary error. The MA sends a response to relay
r to tell it how to react. Ideally, such a solution can
eliminate all over-sensitive tripping of zone 3 relays,
assuming that there is only one transmission line error
in the system and the query-response process can
be completed before relay r is tripped based on its
setting. However, as we discussed in the next section,
the network delay requirement may be violated in real
networks. Therefore, we have to consider practical
network issues to further improve the reliability of zone
3 protection.
As we focus on the issues of SG communication
network, the proposed solution in the following section
will also help many other real-time SG applications
depending on the same communication network.

3

Improving the Agent-Based Solutions

In this section, we first present a simple reservationbased solution to address the concrete network resource
management for the agent-based solutions, as the
baseline study. We then propose a smart scheme
based on the realistic failure cases. Moreover, we
consider the reliability and scalability limitations under
practical network conditions (such as relay errors and
communication link failures), and propose our solutions
to address these limitations using backup paths.
3.1

Basic network resource management for agentbased schemes

The proposed agent-based schemes[8, 9] do not consider
potential issues in communication networks and simply
assume that a network will deliver each message (with
the TCP protocol) on a dedicated network path in the
query-response process. It works if the communication
network only supports the message exchange for zone
3 protection and little other traffic is transmitted
on the same network. This is usually not true in
practice, because a lot of other control and monitoring
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traffic shares the communication network in real-world
deployments[12, 16, 17] .
We first illustrate a basic solution to reserve network
bandwidth for each application similar to existing
network solutions[19] . Note that zone 3 protection is
only one of them. As network errors may occur on the
reserved paths, we further improve the reliability with
(partially) disjoint backup paths to ensure the success
of the query response process. In the following, we will
first present how to perform such reservations and then
discuss its limitation and potential improvement.
3.1.1

Basic management scheme

To address the potential network congestion issues, we
use a basic bandwidth reservation method. Given a
network, we first determine where we should put the
MA on a network and then figure out the corresponding
reservations on each communication link for each zone
3 protection relay.
Communication network topology and MA
location. There are different methods to build the
communication network for an SG, e.g., using powerline communications or long range radio links, or
using common Internet cables and routers to build
a network along the power lines. As power-line
communications or radio links usually have long delays
and low bandwidth, they may work for traditional
low-demanding applications but are not fit for strict
real-time applications. Therefore, the communication
network of SG is usually built with common Internet
devices and has the similar topology as the power
network. In this paper, as many other previous
projects[9] , we assume the communication network
have the same topology as the power transmission
network.
We use the following basic procedure to define
the communication network based on a given power
network topology, e.g., IEEE 39-bus system. For a
given power system, assume we have a power exchange
bus in each substation. We use B to denote the entire
set of buses for a power transmission network. Then,
we sort the buses in B based on their hop counts to the
MA in a decreasing order. For bus b 2 B, we identify
the set of power transmission lines Lb that connect b
with other buses; for power line l 2 Lb , we then find
the set of relays Rl associated with this line, including
both primary and backup relays.
Given the topology of communication network, we
first need to determine where the MA should be located
on the topology and then figure out the bandwidth
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reservations on each network link for protection relays.
Many factors may affect the choice of the MA location,
e.g., it should be close to a major power plant (or
station). In this paper, we use a hop-distance heuristic
to locate the MA at approximately the center of the
topology. In other word, when we build a spanning tree
of the topology with the MA as the root, the tree should
have the minimum height. Using the Dijkstra’s shortest
path algorithm with the MA as the root and assume that
all links have the same weight, we construct the shortest
path from the MA to each power bus and its associated
protection relays. Furthermore, as we know the delay
requirement from a relay to the MA, we can then reserve
bandwidth on each network link along the path for
ensuring delay requirements of zone 3 protection relays.
For easy of illustration, we assume all links have the
identical capacity as in the previous work[8, 9] .
In the following, we present how to reserve
bandwidth on the communication network for relays.
Determination of the delay requirement for each
relay. In an agent-based protection process, four steps
between a relay and the MA introduce communication
delays: (1) A query is sent from a zone 3 protection
relay r to the MA, when it sees a temporary issue (e.g.,
a voltage surge); (2) Once the MA receives the query
from r, the MA checks with other related relays fr 0 :
r 0 2 Rl and r 0 ¤ rg; (3) A response is sent from
each r 0 to the MA; (4) The MA makes a decision based
on the responses and sends its decision to r. To avoid
a false trip at r, the total delay for the above four
steps cannot exceed the delay requirement configured
at r. We ensure the transmission delay via link capacity
reservation, as presented in the following.
We first determine the delay requirement from a relay
to the MA based on the following procedure. For
l 2 Lb , we find two relays r1 and r2 from Rl , who
have the largest and the second-largest hop count hr1
and hr2 to the MA, respectively. (When network links
have different capacities, we can then use the minimum
path delay for this step.) The delay requirement of
zone 3 protection of each relay is initialized to a default
value D0 . (For ease of illustration, we assume that all
zone 3 relays have the same requirement. However, the
requirement of each relay could be different constants,
and we can represent them as D0 .ri / for relay ri .) To
ensure the delay requirement in the zone 3 protection
procedure, we proportionally divide the total delay
requirement between these two relays: in case that one
is a zone 3 relay starting the query process and another
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is among the relays that respond to the MA. That is,
the delay requirement between r1 and the MA is set to
hr1  D0
d1 D
; the delay requirement between r2
2.hr1 C hr2 /
hr2  D0
and the MA is set to d2 D
. For other
2.hr1 C hr2 /
relays of l, their round trip delay requirements are set
as not larger than d2 , because their path lengths to the
MA are equal to or smaller than the length from r2 to
the MA. There is no need to make the other relays to
respond faster than r1 and r2 . (As a relay may be used
to protect multiple different lines, it may have different
settings. In general, we use the minimal setting of a
relay as its preset delay for zone 3 protection.) The
delay assignment algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Reservations at each hop. The existing agent-based
solution assume that a dedicated path is given between
a relay and the MA in order to guarantee the delays of
their message exchanges using TCP. Once we have the
delay assignment for each relay, we can then reserve
corresponding bandwidth on the path from the relay to
the MA. As the path has hr hops from a relay r to the
MA, we equally divide the path delay requirement dr
at each hop as per hop delay requirement dr = hr , as in
many existing methods. (We will further discuss other
advanced assignment methods in the next section based
Algorithm 1 Delay Requirement Assignment Algorithm for
Zone 3 Protection Relays.
Input: Transmission line set L of a power network; Delay
requirements for zone 3 relays
Output: Delay assignment D for zone 3 relays
Method:
1: for each relay r in the system do
2:
dr D 1
F Initialize all delay assignments of relays
3: end for
4: for each line l 2 L do
5:
Find relay r1 and relay r2 in Rl
F Find two relays
furthest from the MA with hop counts hr1 and hr2
6:
determine d1 for r1 and d2 for r2
7:
if dr1 > d1 then F dr1 is the current assignment for r1
8:
dr1 D d1 F Assign a new delay requirement to r1
9:
end if
10:
if dr2 > d2 then F dr2 is the current assignment for r2
11:
dr2 D d2 F Assign a new delay requirement to r2
12:
end if
13:
for each relay r 2 Ll and r ¤ r1 and r ¤ r2 do
14:
if dr > d2 then
F dr is the current assignment
15:
dr D d2
F Assign d2 to r
16:
end if
17:
end for
18: end for
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on more concrete system requirements for comparison.)
For ease of illustration, we assume all the request and
response packets have the same size of L0 . Then, the
capacity to be reserved at each communication link l on
L0  hr
the path j from r to the MA is Crsv .l; j / D
,
dr
where dr is the delay assignment of relay r obtained
based on Algorithm 1. When we consider that k paths
from different relays share a link, the total reservation
on a communication link l is denoted as Crsv .l/Total D
k
X
Crsv .l; j /, where Crsv .l; j / is the reservation for
j D1

r whose path j contains link l, and k is the total
number of paths containing l. We present the bandwidth
reservation algorithm in Algorithm 2. Note that this
requirement is for a single protection application.
Algorithm 2 Bandwidth Reservation Algorithm for Zone 3
Protection Relays.
Input: Relay zone 3 delay assignment D.
Output: Bandwidth reservations on link set L.
Method:
1: for each network link l 2 L do
2:
brsv .l/ D 0;
3:
for each path from r to the MA containing link l do
4:
brsv .l/ D brsv .l/ C Crsv .l; r/;
5:
end for
6: end for

Fig. 2

Now use the IEEE 39-bus system (as shown in
Fig. 2) to illustrate the reservation process. It has
34 transmission lines and 68 protection relays. We
assign the MA at bus 16 because the maximum hop
count from bus 16 to other nodes is the minimum,
compared with all other nodes, and it also has the
highest connection degree in the system. (How to
select the MA location is another interesting problem,
which is out of the scope of this paper.) Each bus
is within a substation that may contain several relays,
e.g., bus 16 is connected with five transmission lines,
thus there are 5 protection relays in this substation.
We assume the communication links between each
substation are the same as the power connection and
each link has the identical capacity as in the previous
projects. To fulfill the strict latency requirement, each
of the applications should be assigned enough capacity.
Assume all applications have identical packet size of 80
bytes, e.g., a basic PMU packet. Applying Algorithm 2,
we observe that: for zone-3 protection, the highest
reservation is 293 Kbps at link between bus 15 and bus
16. However, this is only for the zone 3 protection on
this network. (Many other applications need to share the
network resources.)
Scalability: Limitations of the basic reservation
scheme. As we mentioned, with the development
of SG, more control and monitoring applications

IEEE 39-bus system[9] .
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will be deployed, such as the zone-3 protection or
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) applications. When
we have to support many real-time applications, the
reservation with the above scheme will quickly grow
in proportional to the number of applications. Given
a network with fixed network link capacity, we can
find out how many applications can be supported on
the network. As we know, there are many potential
applications that have the similar or higher level of
traffic requirements as zone 3 protection. Zone 3
protection is just one of many control and protection
schemes.
When using the static method presented in the above,
the number of applications that8 can be assigned
on
9
<
=
Cl
a link l is determined as MIN X
, where
:
Crsv .l/ ;
Cl is the total capacity of link l. For the 39-bus
system, assume the corresponding communication link
capacity is 5T1 (1:54 Mbps  5), for all links[20] . On
such a system, if consider all applications to be
the same priority such as zone 3 protection, with
similar reservation requirements, we can then support
at most 26 such applications on this system; for
many other applications (such as PMU applications)
that usually have high bandwidth requirements, only
a few real-time applications can be supported on
this network. Furthermore, the above scheme assumes
normal network conditions. When more complex
network applications are considered, the scalability
quickly becomes an issue in supporting more real-time
applications. Therefore, we must develop more efficient
schemes, and we focus this issue in the following
investigation.
3.1.2

Smart reservation scheme

To further improve network efficiency, let us consider
more specific conditions in practical systems. In
general, we usually see very few relay errors
simultaneously. In most cases, we often have a single
failure in the system. As a result, only one protection
area is involved in communications with the MA. So,
we do not have to reserve bandwidth for all relays
at the same time as in the above basic scheme, in
which we reserve bandwidth for each relay at every link
on its path to the MA. In such a single failure case,
when multiple relay-to-MA paths are overlapping on a
link, we only need to reserve the maximum bandwidth
requirement for them. We use Algorithm 3 to perform
smart bandwidth reservation under this single failure
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Algorithm 3 Bandwidth Reservation Algorithm for Zone 3
Protection Relays for a Single Failure.
Input: Relay zone 3 delay assignment D, bus set Lb and
communication link set Lc .
Output: Bandwidth reservations on links Lc .
Method:
1: For each communication link l 2 Lc , initialize brsv .l/ to 0
2: for each power line lp 2 Lb do
3:
For all l 2 Lc , set Crsv .l/ to 0 F Crsv .l/ is the calculated
reservation
4:
Find relay set Rs for lp , which contains primary relay set
Rp and backup relay set Rb
5:
for each relay ri 2 Rs do
6:
Calculate the reservation Crsv .ri ; l/ for all
communication links l in path .ri ; MA/
7:
Crsv .l/ D Crsv .l/ C Crsv .ri ; l/
8:
end for
9:
for each l 2 .ri ; MA/ do
10:
if Crsv .l/ > brsv .l/ then
11:
brsv .l/ D Crsv .l/
F Reserve for the maximum
possible capacity usage
12:
end if
13:
end for
14: end for

case.
As the above scheme, all relay-to-MA paths form
a spanning tree rooted at the MA. While each relay
may fail with a probability, only one failure occurs
at a time. Given the system topology, for each power
transmission line lp , we can identify its protection area
that includes a set of relays Rs that are responsible
for the protection. We divide these relays into two
sets: primary relay set Rp and backup relay set Rb . In
general, a relay knows which line it is monitoring.
Then for a transmission line, the abnormal reading at
a backup relay would result in a fixed set of relays
Rs communicating with the MA. (As primary relays
will take actions almost immediately when abnormal
readings are detected, in general they do not need to
consult the MA for making a decision.) Notice that
usually a communication link l is shared by different
subtrees that the reservation on the link should fulfill the
requirement of all subtrees. However, due to the high
requirement of the reliability of power system, a single
failure at a relay is the most common error so that not
all relays in the subtrees have data to send.
For example, Fig. 3a shows the IEEE 13-bus system,
and Fig. 3b shows two protection areas for the system.
Area 1 and Area 2 are partially overlapped protection
areas for power transmission lines Line1 and Line2,
respectively. The two target transmission lines are
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Fig. 3 Smart reservation on a system. Under the single failure condition, only a few relays will generate traffic at a time. The
system can be divided into different protection areas with the corresponding sets of relays.

marked as the red bold line between r3 and r4 and the
green dotted line between r1 and r2 . Here we have
seven relays: four relays only belong to Area 1 (red
rectangles r3 ; r5 ; r8 , and r10 ); one relay only belongs to
Area 2 (the green triangle r2 ); and two relays are used in
both areas (blue solid rectangles r1 and r4 ). Assume for
relay ri , the required capacity on a link l is brsv;i .l/. On
communication linkX
Line5, Area 1 needs a bandwidth
reservation of
brsv;i , while Area 2 needs
iD1;3;4;5;8;10

a bandwidth reservation of

X

brsv;i . Under the

i D1;2;4

condition of single relay failure, only one area would
communicate with the MA across communication link
Line5, although this link is on the paths for all
seven relays to the MA. When any of zone-3 relays
fr1 ; r5 ; r8 ; r10 g sends a request to the MA, traffic will
be generated for protection Area 1. For protection Area
2, r4 is the only zone 3 relay. It may send a request to the
MA due to abnormal readings on Line1. It is obvious
that reserving the larger requirement of these two areas
on the link will achieve the protection of both areas. We
will compare the performance and effectiveness of this
scheme with the basic scheme in the next section.
3.2

Better reliability with backup paths

In real-world deployment, the system faces various
issues due to the unreliability of communication
networks, such as link failures, natural disasters,
or configuration errors. When power devices have
problems, the co-located communication network
usually also experiences difficulties. Although these
failures maybe seldom occur but cannot be completely
eliminated. The ideal network conditions (assumed
in the previous methods for transmitting queries and
responses) are compromised in such situations. The
delay guarantee for such messages may be violated

because the communication paths may not always be
available. To support these critical data exchange, we
propose to use backup paths to address this issue in
order to further improve the effectiveness of agentbased zone 3 protection.
Algorithm 4 shows how we conduct backup paths
for primary paths. First, for each relay has a backup
path, we need to ensure the communication network can
support this. Because we assume the communication
network has the similar topology as the power network,
a bus may only have a single path to the MA. Thus, for
these buses, we need to add a few more communication
links to form a second path for the relay, which is
different from its primary path. After finding a shortest
backup path, we design different methods to divide
the delay requirement from a relay to the MA along
that backup path. The first method is to equally divide
the delay requirement at each hop, as in the basic
delay assignment for primary paths. The second method
considers the hop distance from a relay to the MA on a
path. The motivation is that communication links closer
to the MA usually are shared by more paths than those
further away from the MA. The third method considers
the loads of different links on a path. Another method is
to consider both hop distance and link load in the delay
assignment.
To apply the above delay assignment methods, we
design different delay assignment weights for a relay
at each hop of its path to the MA, as shown in
Weight Function 1 (based on hop distance), Weight
Function 2 (based on link load), and Weight Function
3 (combination of hop distance and link load). The
hop distance based scheme is shown in Weight Function
1. For a relay r, the weight X
at hop i on the backup
hbp .i /
path p is calculated as wi D

i 2p

hbp .i /

, where hbp .i/
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Algorithm 4 Backup-Path Algorithm for Zone 3 Protection
Relays.
Input: All communication links Lc and network topology.
Output: Backup path set Pb with bandwidth reservation
Method:
1: for each link l 2 Lc do F Single link failure can be handled
2:
Identify primary path set Pa affected by the failure of l
3:
for each p 2 Pa do
4:
Find a shortest backup path for p (The backup path
may consist of two parts: the part not overlap with p and the
one overlap with p)
5:
For relay r associated with path p, decide how
to divide delay requirement D0 at each hop i on its
backup path pbp .r/, using one of four alternative schemes:
equal assignment, Weight-Function 1, Weight-Function 2, or
Weight-Function 3, to set up weight w for all links on pbp .r/
6:
for each hop i along the backup path pbp .r/ do
7:
li is the forward link from hop i to the MA
8:
Set delay requirement at i using link weight wi
wi
as Dr .i / D D0  X
wi
i2p

L
Dr .i/
if li is not overlapped with the primary path of r
Reserve bandwidth at li is Brsv .i / D

9:
10:

then
Set reservation Crsv .i / D Brsv .i /
else
Identify the reservation Crsv, pr on the primary

11:
12:
13:

path
14:

15:
16:
17:
18:

set reservation for r as Crsv .i/
D
maxfBrsv .i /; Crsv, pr .i /g
F Primary path and Backup path
would not be used at the same time
end if
end for
end for
end for

is the hop count from hop i to the MA. Then, each
hop i is assigned a local delay requirement of Dr .i / D
wi
D0  X , where D0 is the one-way delay requirement
wi
i 2p

already calculated for relay r at the primary path
assignment. For example, for three hops with hop
distances 3, 2, and 1, their weights are 2, 3, and
6, respectively; their per-hop delay assignments are
2
3
6
D0 ,
D0 , and
D0 . The closer to the MA, the
11
11
11
larger local delay requirement will be, resulting in a
smaller bandwidth reservation.
The link load based scheme is shown in Weight
Function 2. We calculate the weight as follows. Assume
for a relay r, we already find a shortest backup path p.
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Weight Function 1 for per-hop delay assignment
Input: Backup path pb of relay r.
Output: Delay assignment of each hop on pb
Method:
1: Identify the relays delay requirement of path pb
2: for each hop i along the backup path pb do
3:
Identify the hop count hbp .i/
4: end for
5: for each hop i along the backup path pb do
X
hbp .i/
6:
7:

Set weight wi D

i2p

hbp .i/

end for

Weight Function 2 for per-hop delay assignment
Input: Backup path pb of relay r.
Output: Delay requirement of each hop on pb
Method:
1: Identify the relays delay requirement of path pb
2: for each hop i along the backup path pb do
3:
li is the forward link from hop i to the MA
4:
Identify the current reserved capacity Crsv .li / and link
capacity C.li /
Crsv .li /
5:
Set a.li / D 1
C.li /
6: end for
7: for each hop i along the backup path pb do
X
a.li /
8:
9:

Set weight wi D

i

a.li /

end for

Weight Function 3 for per-hop delay assignment
Input: Backup path pb of relay r.
Output: Delay requirement of each hop on pb
Method:
1: Identify the relays delay requirement of path pb
2: for each hop i along the backup path pb do
3:
Calculate the distance weight wi;dst and load weight
wi;load as in Weight-Function 1 and Weight-Function 2
4: end for
5: for each hop i along the backup path pb do
6:
Set the new weight at i as wi D wi;dst  wi;load
7: end for

We first compute the proportion of available capacity
Crsv .li /
on link li 2 p as a.li / D 1
, where Crsv .li /
C.li /
is the reserved capacity on link li and C.li / is the total
capacity. Here link li is the forward link from hop i
to MA. Then,
X the weight at each hop i for a relay r
a.li /
is wi D

i

a.li /

. Similarly, each hop i is assigned
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wi
a local delay requirement of Dr .i / D D0  X .
wi
i2p

We then reserve bandwidth at each hop based on such
delay assignments.
The combine scheme is shown in Weight Function
3. We first follow the above steps to get the weights
based on hop distance and link load, denoted as wi;dst
and wi;load . We then calculate the combined weight
at hop i as wi D wi;dst  wi;load . As in the previous
two methods, the delay requirement at hop i can be
wi
calculated using Dr .i / D D0  X
and the link
wi
i 2p

utilization is also modified.
Assume we have only one communication link failure
at a time, which could randomly occur at any link. We
like to find out how to minimize the impact of such
single failure with backup paths.
The bandwidth reservation on a backup path is
similar to that of a primary path. For example, a backup
path pbp .j / for relay rj at a bus is used when a link l
on its primary path fails. The reservation on each link
L
of the backup path is Crsv .i / D
, where L is the
Dr .i /
size of packets generated from the relay rj , and Dr .i / is
the local delay requirement at hop i that we calculated
with the above delay assignment methods. Note that
when combining the reservation for a backup path with
the reservation for a primary path on a link, we should
consider the requirement of both paths. Assume path
p1 and path p2 are primary paths for adjacent relays
with reservation Crsv .1/ and Crsv .2/ on a link. When
consider path p1 fails, we use a portion of path p2 as
a backup path to deliver that traffic which is supposed
to be transmitted over p1 . To ensure both path p2 and

Fig. 4

the backup path of p1 work, we should reserve at least
Crsv .1/ C Crsv .2/ bandwidth on each shared link on
p2 . It is obvious that such a scheme requires more
bandwidth and will affect the total number applications
that can be supported on the system.

4

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the proposed schemes and
discuss related issues for further improvement.
4.1

Comparison of the basic and smart schemes

We present the numerical result to demonstrate the
advantage of the smart reservation scheme, compared
with the basic scheme. As shown in Fig. 4a, we
considered five different power systems, ranging from
13-bus, 24-bus, 39-bus, 57-bus, to 118-bus. The
top curve shows the maximum bandwidth reservation
required for the basic scheme. The bottom curve shows
the maximum bandwidth reservation of the proposed
smart scheme. (The middle curve is for the double
hidden failure case, as explained in Section 4.2.)
Clearly, the larger the power network, the more link
bandwidth the smart scheme can save, compared with
the basic scheme. Furthermore, Fig. 4b shows the
percentage of bandwidth saved by the smart scheme
compared with the basic scheme, ranging from 37% to
almost 90%.
4.2

Dealing with simultaneous hidden failures

Using the master agent in the power system helps
us prevent false relay trips due to hidden failures.
When a power device has hidden failures, it does not
mean that it is totally damaged; instead, only some
of its normal functionalities are out of order. Due

Comparison of static and smart reservations on five power systems.
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to the high reliability requirement of power systems,
a device is built to work for a long period of time
without maintenance. For example, its Mean Time
To Failure (MTTF) should be higher than 100 000
hours[21] while its Mean Time To Repair (MTTR)
is about 1 hour[22] . This yields a rather low device
failure probability of 10 5 . However, the probability for
hidden failures is much higher, e.g., the hidden failure
probability of a line is given as 10 2[14] . Consider
that hidden failures are mostly triggered by zone 3
relays[3, 6] , the Hidden Failure (HF) probability of a line
can be represented as
P .HF of a line/ D 1 P .a relay is normal/k :
Assume we have k zone-3 relays for this line. We
analyzed the five power systems (IEEE 13-bus to 118bus systems), and found that the average number of
zone-3 relay per transmission line is between 3.1 to
5.6. Plugging into the above formulas, we have the
hidden failure probability at the level of 10 3 per
line. We can see that the case of three simultaneous
relay hidden failures is rare (about 10 9 ). So, we
do not have to consider three or more simultaneous
hidden failures. As current power grid reliability
requirement ranges from “three nines” (99.9%) to
“five nines” (99.999%)[23] , we still have to investigate
the cases where two hidden failures simultaneously
happen in the system. To address this issue, we
extend the smart reservation scheme to deal with two
simultaneous failures. Instead of reserving bandwidth
for the maximum requirement on a link for multiple
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overlapped relay-to-MA paths, we reserve bandwidth
for top-two requirements among these paths. We show
the results of this scheme as the middle curve in
Fig. 4a. The maximum reserved capacity on a link is
a little higher than the single-hidden-failure case.
4.3

Effectiveness of backup scheme

We use the IEEE 39-bus system (Fig. 2) to demonstrate
the backup scheme. The 39-bus system has 34
transmission lines and all buses connected by these
lines have at least two paths to the MA, except bus
19. As we assume the communication links follow
the pattern of power lines, we can find backup paths
on this network for most relays. For bus 19, we add
a communication link between bus 19 and bus 21 for
the reliability purpose. Assume bus 21 is the closest
bus for bus 19. All links have an identical capacity
of 1.5 Mbps. Assume that the failure probability of a
communication link is about 10 5[24] , which is rather
close to the system failure requirement. Thus, the main
consideration of backup paths here is to handle a single
link failure. We use the basic scheme to find both the
primary path and the backup path, since now all power
buses have at least two communication paths to the MA
and the system is able to handle a single link failure. (As
bus 12, bus 20, and bus 30 to bus 38 either connect to
generators or have no transmission lines connected, we
do not need to find backup paths for them). Figure 5a
shows that the primary paths from relays to the MA (bus
16) with thick green lines. Figure 5b demonstrates the
backup path as a yellow dash line to deal with the failure

Fig. 5 Primary path and backup path. In the normal case, the path from bus 25 to the MA is (25, 26, 27, 17, 16); when the link
between bus 25 and bus 26 fails, the backup path (25, 2, 3, 18, 17, 16) is used. The paths to the MA in both figures are highlighted
in bold lines, and the failed path is marked as the red dash line.
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of link (25, 26) on a primary path.
We can further improve the above backup scheme
with the smart reservation scheme, as we usually only
see single link failure. To deal with such single failure,
within a set of power lines, we find out the one that
requires the largest capacity on a specified link and
makes corresponding bandwidth reservation. Notice
that since a backup path may be longer than a primary
path, the per-hop reservation for a backup path may
also be larger. We evaluate such a scheme on the IEEE
39-bus system, and summarize the results of maximum
link reservation in Table 1. For the cases in the first
row, we add up the reservations of all relays on a
link; for the second row, we reserve link bandwidth
under the assumption of single hidden failure. The four
columns are corresponding to the four delay weight
assignment methods discussed in the above. We can
see that, in general, the smart backup scheme requires
much less capacity than the basic backup scheme. In
the basic backup scheme, the hop distance and link load
both help reduce bandwidth by lowering the maximum
bandwidth reservation on links. For the smart scheme,
the equal division and the load-based delay assignment
outperform the other two.
4.4

Discussions

4.4.1

Potential hot spots in primary paths

A potential problem when equally dividing the delay
requirement on a primary path is that it might generate
hot spots around the master agent. On one side, this
may be inevitable on a given network topology, since
we only have limited number of path choices for relays;
on the other side, we can mitigate this problem by
“pushing” the capacity requirement away from the
MA. A simple scheme is to divide the delay at each hop
according to the hop count to the MA. We performed
a test on the IEEE 39-bus system, which shows that
this method can reduce the reservation at link 20 (from
bus 15 to bus 16) from 293 Kbps to 150 Kbps and the
reservation at link 21 (from bus 17 to bus 16) from
247 Kbps to 140 Kbps. In this way, the links closest to
MA now are able to handle more application traffic.
Table 1 Comparison of maximum link reservation for basic
and smart backup schemes.
(Kbps)

Basic
Smart

Equal
division
835
85

Hop
distance
790
153

Load

Combination

741
76

729
149

4.4.2 Responses to the MA from multiple relays
For the protection of a power line, multiple relays are
involved. The MA need to query all of them whenever
a relay inquires the MA because the relay sees an
abnormal reading. For example, power line 8 has two
primary relays (relay 15 and relay 16) and four zone
3 relays (relay 9 at bus 3, relay 14 at bus 5, relay 35
at bus 13, and relay 38 at bus 15). When one of the
four zone-3 relays sees an abnormal value, it inquires
the MA; other relays will be queried by the MA to make
decision. If we do not consider potential network issues,
each relay response is received by the MA on time,
and only a few responses (one or two) are sufficient
for the MA to make a correct decision. However, as
we do not know which relay will inquire the MA and
which response will be received first ahead of time, we
need to provide resource reservation for all participating
relays. This is an interesting issue to be examined in our
future research.
4.4.3

Importance of transmission links and power
lines
In this paper, we assume all transmission links and
power lines are of the same importance. However,
in practical deployment this may not be the
case. Power lines may be distinguished according
to their functionality, such as whether it is close to a
generator or how much power it delivers. For example,
in IEEE 39-bus system, under the initial setting, line 9,
line 22, and line 27 carry more than 450 MW power,
which is relatively higher than other lines; thus, they
deserve better protection. In addition, the consequence
of line failure can also be used for prioritizing the
power lines. Voltage Stability Index (VSI)[25] is one
good indicator for the stability condition of a power
line. For example, when the reactive load at bus 28
is higher than 760 MVar, tripping power line 33 will
result in the highest VSI in the system, which means
the system is becoming unstable and prone to system
failure; while tripping line 9 brings less changes to the
VSIs of other lines. In other words, line 33 is more
important than line 9 in this case. We are currently
investigating the VSI-based priority of power lines for
the zone 3 protection.
Another issue is the transmission link quality. Due
to the fact that links at different locations in the
system carry different volumes of traffic and the
importance of the traffic depends on the applications. A
reasonable assumption is that the reliability of links
also varies accordingly. For example, links close
to the MA may have a higher reliability or even
equipped with a local backup link because they are
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critical for many applications. This point also deserves
further exploration, depending on the reliability data of
practical networks.
4.4.4 Overlaps of primary and backup paths
Under the condition of single communication link
failure, if a backup path of a relay does not overlap with
its primary path, the communication between the relay
and MA is guaranteed. However, for a given network
topology, a completely non-overlap backup path for
each relay is not always available, which is one of the
real constraints in network deployment. When a backup
path is overlapping with its primary path, it will also
fail if one of the overlapped links fails. When a relay
sees an abnormal reading of a remote power line, it
inquires the MA for a decision. If the overlapped links
fail, the query or the final decision cannot be received
on time so that the relay may falsely be tripped. Given
the network topology and transmission link parameters,
we can determine the probability for the false tripping
of a power line due to communication link failure as:
X
Pf .linei / D
Pf .linkji;1 /C

Fig. 6 Overlapping condition of primary and backup paths
in 39-bus system.

linkji;1 2.PRi;1 \BPi;1 /

X

Pf .linkji;2 /;

linkji;2 2.PRi;2 \BPi;2 /

where ri;1 and ri;2 are the two relays that locate at each
end of linei ; PRi;1 , PRi;2 , BPi;1 , and BPi;2 are the
primary and backup paths for the relays, respectively;
linkji;1 and linkji;2 are the j -th link of the backup
paths for the two relays, and each of them is on the
overlapping portion of the primary and backup paths of
a relay.
As an example, we examine the case when using a
shortest path as a backup path for the primary path. The
overlapping condition of primary and backup paths is
shown in Fig. 6, in which the overlapping ratio is
calculated as the ratio of the number of overlapping
link on a backup path to the number of total hop count
of the backup path. We assume each communication
link has a failure probability of 10 5 . The false tripping
probability of each power line due to a communication
link failure is shown in Fig. 7. As we usually expect
the failure probability of a power line does not exceed
a given threshold, the backup scheme works when the
threshold is 10 4 as the horizontal dash line shown in
the figure: All lines meet the requirement. However,
as the requirements vary for different applications and
some may require much higher reliability, the backup
path also needs improvement to fulfill more strict
requirements.

Fig. 7

5

False tripping probability in 39-bus system.

Conclusions and Ongoing Work

In this paper we have examined the existing agent-based
solutions and proposed several new methods to further
minimize the false trips of zone 3 relays. Our analysis
and simulation results show that the proposed schemes
can further reduce the potential zone 3 relay errors and
improve the stability of power systems.
Although the above proposed scheme may work well
for a limited number of applications, the scalability
of such schemes may become an issue as more and
more SG applications are being deployed[12, 16, 17] .
We are currently further investigating a statistical
network management scheme to address the scalability
issue. Such a scheme can support many important
real-time applications with a low chance of control
failures.
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